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Summary
The UK’s food supply is not as safe as it should be. 
There are serious risks that if and when the UK leaves the EU, food safety standards will decline rather than rise; this 
is a particular risk if the UK reaches free trade deals with countries that have lower standards than the EU, such as 
the USA and China.
The Food Standards Agency (FSA) is proposing a programme of change (called Regulating Our Future - or ROF) that 
will destabilise the institutions responsible for enforcing food safety standards. 
Implementing ROF will make the UK’s food supply even less safe; restructuring food regulation when the institutions 
are already stretched is doubly bad policy in the context of Brexit, when the public needs a strong vigilant and 
effective FSA.
The FSA proposes transferring responsibility for food safety inspections and audits from the public sector to private 
commercial third-party assurance providers. When public concern is understandably high, after the collapse of 
outsourcing company Carillion, this entire strategy deserves rigorous scrutiny, which it is not receiving.
The new quasi-outsourced inspection and audit system will create irreconcilable conflicts of interest; consumers 
will suffer. 
The 1999 Food Standards Act, which established the FSA, assumed that safety and quality standards would be 
enforced by adequately trained and resourced local authority Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) and Trading 
Standards Officers (TSOs) in collaboration with Public Analysts. ROF contradicts that expectation. 
The government cut the FSA’s budget by nearly 23% in the period from 2011-12 to 2016-17, and the number of 
samples taken for testing by EHOs in the UK fell by 22%, and in England by almost 25%.  At that rate of reduction, 
testing will have ceased in less than 4 years. 
Only one aspect of the ROF proposals could benefit consumers, namely the proposal to enforce the mandatory 
registration of all Food Business Operators (FBOs). 
Local authority EHOs want to be able to refuse to register FBOs that cannot demonstrate they can produce food that 
is safe and honestly labelled.
Currently the FSA knows far too little about what food businesses are doing, but consumers know even less; to push 
this further at arms’ length from local authorities is dangerous.
Implementing the proposals in ROF could well harm the ability of British FBOs to sell their products into the single 
market of the European Union after Brexit.  The EU will almost certainly refuse to accept imports of UK food products, 
unless all safety standards have been enforced by public sector institutions and personnel. 
The FSA hopes that FBOs and third-party assurance sub-contractors will readily share any data the FSAs request; 
in exchange the FSA has promised to keep all those data, and presumably all analyses of those data, entirely 
confidential. But you cannot ‘put consumers first’ by keeping them in the dark. 
ROF is nothing but a fundamental shift in the role, mode of working and public responsibilities of the FSA and local 
authority officers. 
>
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>
>
>
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Why ‘Regulating Our 
Future’ matters at a time of 
Brexit
In July 2017, the Food Standards Agency (or FSA) 
published a document entitled Regulating our Future: 
Why food regulation needs to change and how we are 
going to do it.1  In this Briefing, that document, and 
the proposals it contained, will be referred to with the 
abbreviation: ‘ROF 2017’.  
In the ROF document, the FSA announced that it 
was: “... planning fundamental changes to how 
we regulate.”2 The proposed changes were less 
than entirely clear, partly because many details 
remained vague. Several of the apparent reasons for 
proposing the changes were also factually incorrect.  
This document critically assesses the substance, 
assumptions and implications of those proposals, 
with a particular focus on their relevance in the 
context of Brexit.
The UK’s food supply is not as safe as it should be.  
For example, levels of infectious campylobacter on 
chicken carcasses and cuts of meat are so high that, 
in 2014, the Food Standards Agencya (FSA) published 
advice to the public and commercial caterers not to 
wash carcasses or cuts of meat3.   
The disclosure in September 2017 of serious 
problems at a 2 Sisters chicken processing plant 
showed that current inspection regimes were 
inadequate. Revelations in January 2018 of very 
serious shortcomings at plants owned by Russell 
Hume, and subsequently by DB Foods, Muscle Meats4 
and Fairfax Meadow5 combined to reinforce that 
impression.
Inspections of food businesses by Local Authority 
officials and by the FSA are under-resourced because 
of the government’s insistence on austerity.  The 
regime of inspection of food businesses therefore 
needs to be strengthened, but the FSA’s proposals 
a  In this document, when the abbreviation ‘FSA’ is used, unless 
otherwise specified, it refers to the London-based FSA.  When referring 
collectively to the other counterpart agencies in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland the abbreviation will be ‘FSAs,’ though that will also be 
used to refer to all four agencies collectively. 
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Recommendations
To protect food-related public health in the UK, almost every aspect of ROF should be discarded. 
At the very least, it should be halted pending the enquiries we propose.
The 1999 Food Standards Act should be amended to give the FSA (and counterparts in Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and Wales) the power to oblige FBOs to collect minimum food safety and 
quality monitoring data on their ingredients, processes and products, and the power to require 
all FBOs to share those data with their local authorities and with the FSA.
Those data should be used, amongst other things, to create and publish food safety performance 
league tables, categorising all types of FBOs along the lines of the Food Hygiene Rating System, 
rather than restricting the scheme just to restaurants and cafes.
A special Parliamentary joint select committee, between the Health and Environment, Food & 
Rural Affairs committees, should be urgently convened to review the ROF proposals. 
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are predicated on an expectation of future reductions 
in resources.  
The FSA admitted that it knows almost nothing about 
the safety standards in individual food processing 
plants.  “There is a fundamental weakness in the 
current model as the FSA doesn’t know in real time 
how many food businesses actually exist or, who is 
operating them. We aren’t able to draw a complete 
picture, whether in a food incident or crisis, or just 
to make the best decisions.”6  It does need to be far 
better informed, but so too do consumers.  
Unfortunately the FSA’s proposals in ROF 2017 were 
not primarily focussed on improving the flow of 
information to it or to consumers,7  instead the FSA 
proposed a transfer of responsibility for food safety 
inspections and audits away from the public sector, 
to private commercial organisations.  It proposed that 
food business operators (or FBOs) should contract 
with commercial organisations, called third-party 
assurance providers, to inspect and audit their 
compliance with food safety regulations.  In effect the 
public sector’s responsibilities for ensuring that food 
safety regulations and standards are complied with 
will be substantially out-sourced to the private sector.
The status quo is undoubtedly problematic, and 
policy could be changed in a variety of competing 
directions.  The direction proposed by the FSA will 
however be bad news for UK consumers, and may 
well bring long-term reputational damage to the 
FSA.  If and when evidence emerges showing that 
implementing the ROF 2017 proposals resulted in 
deteriorating standards of food safety, if it is likely 
that the FSA will be blamed, rather than the ministers 
who compelled the FSA to out-source food safety 
inspections and audits.
The latest proposals are not in the interests of the 
consuming publics, and they are not even in the FSA’s 
interests.  The FSA has really just offered to ministers 
what they have demanded, which is ironic because, 
when the FSA was established, the British public 
was told that the FSA would be independent of the 
food industry and of government ministers, but that 
pretence was always misleading.8 
The issues and challenges raised by the FSA’s 
proposals are not an arcane set of boring issues 
concerning the allocation of responsibilities for 
bureaucratic procedures; they go to the heart of 
how the public interest, in this case in relation to 
food safety and public health, is being undermined 
by a toxic combination of austerity and Brexit.  In 
context of Brexit, the FSA’s proposals are especially 
problematic.
Is there a need to change? 
If so why?
In ROF 2017, under the heading ‘Reasons for Change’, 
the FSA said:
“We are changing the existing approach 
to regulating the food industry because 
we believe it is outdated and becoming 
increasingly unsustainable. It has been in 
place for more than 30 years and has served 
consumers well, but has not kept pace with 
technological change in the food industry, and 
is not flexible enough to adapt to the changing 
environment. The existing ‘one size fits all’ 
approach to regulating food businesses is ill-
suited to the incredibly diverse nature of the 
industry. In recent years, we have witnessed 
large numbers of new players enter the global 
food and food safety landscape; for example, 
online retailers, food delivery services, private 
auditors, independent food safety certification 
schemes. These and many other developments 
have reduced risks, created different risks, 
increased risks. But the current regulatory 
approach doesn’t allow us easily to focus our 
effort on changing risks. It’s clunky, rather than 
flexible and agile”9
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But that explanation is not convincing.  Firstly, it is 
not correct to claim that the existing approach to 
regulating the food industry has been in place for 
more than 30 years or that it has served consumers 
well. During the interval since the BSE crisis of 1986 
the system for regulating the UK food system has 
changed substantially. The Food Standards Agency 
was not established until April 2000, and the 
European Food Safety Authority was only created in 
2002. Moreover there have been numerous occasions 
when evidence has emerged showing that food in 
the UK and EU is not as safe as consumers want and 
deserve it to be.  The last 30 years have witnessed 
numerous changes in institutions, practices and 
concerns.  
The Sussex Chief Environmental Health Officers (or 
EHOs) Group has also criticised the suggestion that 
little has changed over 30 years; it has argued that:
“There have been some technological changes 
to food consumption, particularly the use of 
apps to purchase food …These apps do not 
link to the Food Hygiene Rating as there is no 
mandatory requirement in England to do so. 
Despite the lack of information to consumers, 
these on line food retailers do not pose 
additional risks or changed risks, they are 
subject to the [same] food safety legislation as 
all other high street businesses. It is not clear 
what changed risks the FSA are referring to. 
…The allegation that ‘one size fits all’ does not 
sit well. The FSA’s own food law code specifies 
the time intervals between inspections/
interventions based on risk. The same food law 
code allows local authorities the flexibility to 
adopt a range of approaches to food regulation; 
use of alternative enforcement questionnaires, 
education and advise [stet], sampling as 
verification, part inspections for broadly 
compliant businesses and whole inspections 
where necessary. Local authority officers are 
free to spend longer in a business where the 
food business operator requires support and 
guidance and shorter time with those that 
demonstrate good controls.”10
The main reason why the FSA has concluded that its 
proposals were required only emerged at the end, 
rather than at the beginning, of its explanation.   
“Finally, the model is financially unsustainable, 
with taxpayers bearing the cost of food 
regulation in a way that is incompatible with 
wider regulatory policy. At the same time, local 
authorities who deliver most of the current 
activity are under increasing financial pressure, 
such that some are struggling to fully discharge 
their functions.”11 (emphasis added) 
There is clear evidence that the FSA’s budget has 
been declining even in cash terms, but especially 
when the effects of inflation are taken into account. 
Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the 
changing budgets for the Food Standards Agency 
in London, and for the sum of the budgets of FSA 
London and its counterpart agencies in the devolved 
administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland.  The lines suggest that expenditure on the 
agencies increased in cash terms from 2010-11 to 
2013-14, and then subsequently declined, though in 
2016-17 the figures were greater than those for 2010-
11. 
In Figure 2, however, the cash figures have been 
adjusted for inflation, by reference to the Consumer 
Prices Index, to 2010 prices.  It shows that the highest 
levels of investment in the FSAs occurred in 2011-12, 
and that they have subsequently declined.  For FSA 
London, the 2016-17 figure was 22.8% below that for 
2011-12; while for the aggregate expenditure of all the 
agencies the 2016-17 figure was 16.3% below that for 
2011-12.
While there is clear evidence that the resources 
available to the FSA(s) have declined, there are far 
fewer figures reporting or estimating the expenditures 
by local authorities on eg Environmental Health 
Officers (EHOs), Trading Standards Officers (TSOs) 
and Public Analysts. But figures issued by the FSA 
reveal that between 2015/16 and 2016/17 the number
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Figure 1: Budget of FSA London, and for the sum of the UK’s Food standards agencies, 2010-2017, in annual cash terms. Source: FSA Annual 
Reports and Accounts, available at https://www.food.gov.uk/about-us/data-transparency-accounts/busreps/annualreport
Figure 2: Budget of FSA London, and for the sum of the UK’s Food standards agencies, 2010-2017, in constant 2010 prices. Sources: FSA 
Annual Reports and Accounts: https://www.food.gov.uk/about-us/data-transparency-accounts/busreps/annualreport and UK Office of National 
Statistics:https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/datasets/consumerpriceinflation
of food samples collected by EHOs in the entire UK 
fell by 22% (from 21,563 to 16,746), while just in 
England they fell by 24.9%  (ie almost one quarter, 
from 12,245 to 9,196). The FSA acknowledged that 
“…local authorities…are under increasing financial 
pressure, such that some are struggling to fully 
discharge their functions.”  What is puzzling is why, if 
the FSA believes that some local authorities are not 
fully meeting their statutory obligations, the Agency 
has not used its statutory powers under the Food 
Standards Act to deal with those ‘struggling’ local 
authorities?
In a paper prepared for the FSA’s Board meeting of 
17 March 2017, an excerpt of an earlier Risk Register 
was reproduced, indicating that the FSA assumed 
that it and local authorities may be: “Unable to 
draw on resources as required. Likely to manifest 
with regards to people (i) capacity constraint; (ii) 
capability constraint or (iii) financial constraint and 
any combination of above.”  It was evident that the 
FSA assumed that austerity had undermined, and 
in future would further undermine, the ability of 
local authorities fully to discharge their statutory 
responsibilities in relation to food safety. 
The FSA’s use of the expression ‘wider regulatory 
policy’ can best be understood by reference to the 
UK government’s Regulatory Futures Review that was 
published by the Cabinet Office in January 2017. That 
document referred to ‘regulated self-assurance’ and 
‘earned recognition’, by which it meant that firms 
(including presumably FBOs) that can demonstrate 
that they adopt and deliver consistently high 
standards, can be subject to lighter touch regulatory 
enforcement.  The document proclaimed: “In practice 
this means that businesses who ‘do the right thing’ 
should be regulated with a very light touch.”  
The ROF 2017 proposals reflected the spirit of the 
Regulatory Futures Review, when it envisaged 
transferring responsibility for meeting the costs of 
food safety inspections, audits and enforcement 
activities from public bodies to the individual FBOs. 
The government argues that firms should pay the 
costs of assuring their compliance with statutory 
minimum requirements, rather than requiring public 
expenditure.
The perspectives of the proprietors and managers of 
most FBOs are distinctively different. Their view is that 
they are already paying for such services because 
business rates are significantly higher than rates of 
council tax on residential properties; they argue that 
the FSA’s proposals imply that they would be double-
charged by being made to pay twice.  
The FSA’s approach to ROF first emerged in February 
2016.  It occurred four months before the Referendum 
on the UK’s membership of the EU, and a full 11 
months ahead of the Regulatory Futures Review.  So 
while the FSA could be said to have been ‘ahead of 
the curve’, it would be less convincing to argue that 
the FSA is independent of changing fashions in the 
policies of the government.  
The FSA was almost certainly correct to acknowledge 
that some local authorities have ‘struggled’ (ie 
failed) fully to meet their statutory responsibilities; 
but cynics might suggest that the same was true 
of the FSA in London, and some of its counterparts 
in the devolved administrations.  As evidence they 
could cite the revelations about shortcomings in 
the operations of eg 2 Sisters and Russell Hume. 
While it is far too soon to judge the outcome of the 
negotiations between the UK and the EU, let alone 
the outcomes of subsequent trade negotiations with 
current and potential trading partners, it is already 
clear that the budgets of the FSA, and counterpart 
agencies in the devolved administrations, will need to 
rise, and not to decline. 
It will be a privatisation, but 
will it be self-regulation?
The FSA’s proposals are for many inspection and 
auditing services to be privatised, though that 
particular term does not appear in any of the FSA’s
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documentation.  But the FSA insisted that it was not 
proposing ‘self-regulation’.12  The FSA did not propose 
that FBOs should mark their own homework, but only 
that they should sub-contract with an appropriate 
service provider that they would choose to mark their 
homework for them, providing ‘third-party assurance’. 
The FSA proposal is for FBOs increasingly to 
be inspected and audited by private sector 
organisations, with which they will have contractual 
relationships.  But if responsibility for much of those 
functions and responsibilities is transferred from the 
public to the private sector, it would be reasonable to 
expect that potential service providers will compete 
on price, and that FBOs will often select providers by 
reference to their prices.  The FSA document includes 
what it terms a set of ‘principles’, one of which 
asserts that: “Businesses should meet the costs of 
regulation, which should be no more than they need 
to be.”13 (emphasis added)
That implies that FBOs will be expected to select 
the cheapest available service providers, and also 
suggests that the FBOs will decide what they deem 
to be ‘needed’.  Some may aim fully to comply 
with statutory minima, while others might pursue 
what is termed as a ‘compliance-plus’ strategy.14 
That suggests that some FBOs will employ those 
contractors that, while satisfying the FSA’s minimum 
requirements, will monitor the fewest parameters 
and least often, and that those FBOs will only wish to 
employ service providers that can be relied upon not 
to cause them any commercial difficulties.  Together 
those considerations imply that food safety standards 
are more likely to fall than rise.
In an attempt to counter that possibility the FSA said:
“…we will implement measures that mitigate 
against the risks of any provider, public or 
private, cutting compliance corners, in the 
interest of higher margins, or to win and retain 
business and revenue.”15
However, no clarity was provided concerning what 
such measures might be, nor how they might be 
judged reliable and sufficient. The FSA’s proposals 
seem to assume that food safety standards need 
not decline as public expenditure on food safety is 
reduced, because the private sector will meet all the 
requisite costs, and do a good job at lower cost.  Both 
historical experience and knowledge of institutional 
behaviour, however, suggest that the FSA is being 
distinctly over-optimistic.  
Do the FSA’s proposals ‘put 
customers first’?
The FSA asserted that: “We need to be sure that all 
elements of our system inspire confidence”.16  That 
remark was ambiguous as it failed to indicate whose 
confidence needs to be ‘inspired’ or specify in what 
that confidence might be warranted.  The rhetoric 
in ROF 2017 implied that the Agency assumed 
that prevailing arrangements were sufficient to 
warrant high levels of confidence, on the part of 
consumers, in the safety of the UK’s food supply.  It 
optimistically assumed that high levels of regulatory 
compliance with food safety regulations were being 
achieved in the UK’s food chain.  Such a suggestion 
was, however, unconvincing.  As the Commons 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee said 
in its report on the crisis in the autumn of 2017 over 
the 2 Sisters plant in West Bromwich: “The problems 
identified at the 2 Sisters plant at West Bromwich are 
not a one-off.”17 By which the Select Committee meant 
that the problems in the 2 Sisters operations were not 
confined just to that one plant.  
The shortcomings in the operation of meat-cutting 
plants operated by Russell Hume, which emerged 
in January 2018, were so serious that the entire 
operation of the enterprise was shut down by the FSA, 
and the firm subsequently went into administration.18   
Such examples show that FBOs cannot be relied 
upon to act in their own best interests, let alone the 
best interests of their customers. Those disclosures 
showed that 2 Sisters was not a ‘one-off’, and on
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1st February 2018, the FSA announced that it would 
conduct a ‘review of cutting plants and cold stores’.19   
That constituted a tacit acceptance that high levels of 
confidence were not warranted. 
It is also important to appreciate that, in the months 
preceding the disclosures about 2 Sisters, the West 
Bromwich plant had been inspected by the FSA and 
by local authority Trading Standards Officers, but 
neither of those parties had uncovered such failings.  
Furthermore, the plant and its operating company, 
were fully certified by the British Retail Consortium 
(BRC). Indeed a 2 Sisters website proclaimed that:
“We are subject to multiple and frequent 
unannounced audits from the FSA, BRC, Red 
Tractor, independent auditors as well as our 
customers. By example, our facility in the West 
Midlands under investigation received nine 
audits (five unannounced) in the months of July 
and August alone.”20 
In November 2017 the Commons EFRA Committee 
confirmed that: “Both Red Tractor and BRC Global 
Standards had accredited the 2 Sisters plant in West 
Bromwich.”21  Moreover: 
“The previous audit of the plant [by FSA 
Operations Assurance] took place on 19 July 
- around the same time as the undercover 
footage of the plant was gathered – and nine 
‘minor discrepancies were found’. As a result, 
‘it was not showing up as a high-risk plant’. The 
last unannounced inspection of the plant by the 
FSA took place in November 2016.”22 
In a report on BBC Radio Four’s Food Programme, 
in response to the 2 Sisters story, the commentator 
explained that: 
“Most of the scrutiny of the UK’s food supply 
by the Food Standards Agency and certification 
bodies like Red Tractor come in the form of 
audits.  Most are carried out by appointment, 
a small number are unannounced, but even 
that approach isn’t fool proof, according to the 
industry responses given to Mike Stones [of 
Food Manufacturer magazine].  One large pig 
manufacturer has this tacit relationship with 
its staff, a tacit understanding, that when they 
hear over the PA system the message ‘Mr Jones 
is in reception’ that is code for: ‘there is an 
unannounced safety audit taking place now’.  
And everyone knows what that means…”23 
Nonetheless, the FSA had asserted that: 
“Many businesses invest heavily in internal 
processes that provide them with assurance 
that they are managing their food safety and 
standards-related risks…Where these processes 
are robust and where they meet the standards 
set by the FSA, we intend them to be the 
starting point in our new model…This means 
good, responsible, compliant businesses 
will face a lower burden from regulation, and 
free up local authority resources to target the 
businesses that present the greatest (residual) 
risk to public health… We will introduce digitally 
enabled technologies to enable assurance 
data to flow into the system, and – as far as 
possible – to have it in real time. As technology 
becomes smarter and cheaper, this should be 
as helpful to small businesses as it is to big 
firms.”24 
The FSA evidently assumes that third-party assurance 
schemes routinely help FBOs keep up with new 
requirements and good practices and provide 
evidence of the quality of their food processes, but 
the example of 2 Sisters demonstrates that that is 
seriously over-optimistic. Third-party schemes are 
mainly box-ticking exercises, and are not based 
on the kinds of inspection that EHOs and Trading 
Standards Officers (TSOs) have routinely provided.
The Commons EFRA Committee’s investigation into 2 
Sisters concluded that: 
“For an industry which takes pride in the 
quality of its produce, we were surprised to 
hear of the apparently patchwork nature of the
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accreditation process. It appears relatively 
simple for someone to game the system 
and hide infractions – by opting out of 
unannounced visits by the accreditors for 
example – and the lack of joined up intelligence 
and knowledge-sharing seemingly presents 
many gaps into which misdemeanours can 
fall…”25 
The ‘audits’ currently provided by third-party 
organisations are consequently seriously inadequate, 
and cannot be expected to provide the basis for 
the kinds of food safety reassurances that the FSA’s 
proposals envisage.   Indeed, neither public nor third-
party inspections and audits, as currently conducted, 
can be relied upon to uncover misbehaviour of the 
sort that occurs when inspection are not taking 
place.  Nonetheless ROF 2017 was predicated on the 
assumption that third-party assurance schemes could 
provide an effective replacement for inspections by 
local authority officers and FSA officials.  The FSA may 
have been indulging in optimistic wishful thinking, 
though in so doing they were acting in accordance 
with ministerial instructions.  
Is UK food supply safe and 
will ROF make it less safe?
While the FSA Board has published documents that 
are predicated on the assumption that the UK food 
supply is suitably safe, other parts of the FSA have 
issued advice warning consumers, and commercial 
caterers, not to wash chicken carcasses or meat is 
(until further notice), to reduce the risks of spreading 
Campylobacter infectivity.26  
That the FSA has concluded that the UK chicken 
supply is too contaminated with Campylobacter for 
it safely to be washed, entails that current levels 
of hygiene in poultry sheds, abattoirs and meat-
cutting and processing plants are seriously deficient 
and that too many poultry flocks are chronically 
contaminated with pathogenic bacteria. Those facts 
collectively entail that the status quo is already 
unsatisfactory, and that current levels and types of 
inspections and enforcement actions are insufficient, 
and that certification by external commercial bodies 
cannot be relied upon to achieve the standards 
nominally required by legislation.  If the FSA and 
local authorities do not currently have sufficient and 
competent resources to conduct the inspections that 
are presently required, they will not in the foreseeable 
future be able adequately to inspect firms providing 
third-party assurance services.  
It is important to appreciate that, while in 2017 the 
FSA proposed a substantial privatisation of food 
inspection and control functions, inspections of 
two key up-stream stages of the meat chain had 
previously been privatised.27  A firm of contractors, 
Eville & Jones, was awarded by the FSA a two-
year £43.4m contract in January 2017 to recruit 
and provide professional veterinarians to work 
supervising abattoirs, and in meat cutting plants; they 
are supposed to inspect animals before slaughter 
and carcasses afterwards.28  The majority of the 
vets recruited by the contractor are non-UK EU 
citizens, without whom the UK meat supply would be 
unsustainable.
The FSA was evidently aware that its proposals would 
be criticised.29  It is, however not clear why the FSA 
expects to have sufficient resources to be able to 
ensure that food hygiene and safety standards will be 
met if and when its proposals are fully implemented. 
ROF 2017 claimed that it is: “…time to improve the way 
we deliver regulatory controls in food...we intend to...
create a modern, risk-based, proportionate, robust 
and resilient system.” It certainly is high time that the 
performance of FBOs, the FSAs and of local authority 
inspectors was improved but, the suggestion that 
replacing many or most public inspections and audits 
with oversight by commercial third-party providers 
working under contracts to FBOs would raise 
standards is profoundly unconvincing.  It is far more 
likely that standards will decline.  
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Questioning the FSA’s 
assumptions
This section focusses on, and critically examines, four 
sets of assumptions that underpin the FSA’s approach 
to the future of food safety enforcement in the UK.  
The discussion is not comprehensive, let alone 
exhaustive, but rather focusses on key problematic 
features of ROF 2017.
Modernisation’ and safety 
assurance
 
The FSA document says:
“We intend to improve delivery of controls 
across the food chain, including those 
for animal feed, but we are prioritising 
improvement where there has been no 
modernisation of the system in recent years 
and where it is most needed.” (Regulating Our 
Future p. 3)
That wording suggests that the FSA assumes that 
‘modernisation’ can be relied upon the improve food 
safety, where ‘modernisation’ is almost certainly 
being understood as consisting of technological and 
organisational innovations.  Sometimes innovative 
changes, such as refrigeration, can reduce food-
borne risks to public health, but the FSA failed to 
acknowledge that ‘modernisation’ can also increase 
risks rather than diminish them.  In particular, in 
the livestock industries, and especially in poultry 
production, the pursuit of economies of scale, and 
consequently increased scale and complexity of 
operations, and their automation, create conditions 
for the rapid spread of pathogens and contaminants.  
The greater the numbers of animals housed together, 
with increasing density of animals per square metre, 
and in the case of poultry stacked at higher densities 
per cubic metre, the more likely they are to create 
conditions in which infective pathogens can readily 
colonise the premises and their inhabitants.
It is therefore not surprising that most chicken 
carcasses are highly contaminated with bacteria, 
from their faeces, which are known to cause food 
poisoning.  Furthermore, the most ‘modern’ slaughter 
houses and meat cutting and processing plants kill, 
eviscerate, de-feather and cut carcasses at higher 
rates than ever before, and provide remarkably 
suitable conditions for microbial pathogens to grow 
and spread, increasing the numbers of infected 
products. Those considerations suggest that 
focussing mainly on facilities that are not the most 
‘modern’ and paying less attention to the most 
‘modern’, is an unwise tactic.  After all, the 2 Sisters 
poultry processing plant highlighted by ITN and the 
Guardian was one of the most ‘modern’ in the UK. 
The FSA’s proposals also imply that it assumes that 
large food processors and retail chains already have 
sufficient knowledge and control of their supply 
chains to ensure that they only sell safe and honestly 
labelled foods and beverages.  The lessons of the 
‘horsegate’ saga and the scandals at 2 Sisters in 2017 
and Russell Hume and others in 2018 reveal that such 
assumptions are over-optimistic.  After all, the remit 
of the FSA’s Food Crime Unit is limited to ‘intelligence 
gathering’; it has no investigative function, and lacks 
the resources to take on such responsibilities.30    
Modernisation cannot be relied upon to ensure food 
safety; on the contrary it can contribute significantly 
to undermining food safety.  When in the UK in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, the renderers of abattoir 
wastes introduced flow process technologies to 
replace batch processing they presented it as 
technological modernisation.  In the event those 
changes contributed to the development of Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (or Mad Cow Disease), 
which devastated the UK cattle industry and 
understandably undermined domestic and overseas 
confidence in the safety of British beef and in the 
UK food safety policy-making system.  The first Chair 
of the FSA Board, John Krebs, correctly portrayed 
the FSA as a child of the BSE crisis.31  It would be 
remarkably ironic if the FSA were to be undermined 
by mistakenly adopting an assumption, the falsity of
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which had previously contributed to the FSA’s 
creation. 
Facilitating exports?
ROF 2017 acknowledged, in effect, that its proposals 
were intended not just to keep the UK food supply 
safe, but also to help FBOs that want to export their 
products, especially to the EU.  The document states 
that: 
“We need to be sure that all elements of our 
system inspire confidence in those who are 
deciding whether we provide adequate control 
of the feed and food chains.”32  
That implied that the FSA wants to be able to 
persuade the European Food Safety Authority (or 
EFSA) and the European Commission to continue 
to allow UK FBOs to sell their products into the EU 
after Brexit.  That aspiration seems distinctly over-
optimistic, as was clear from a report issued by the 
FSA, following a collaborative study between the FSA 
and the British Retail Consortium (which represents 
the major retailers), published in September 2017, 
which said:
“Under current EU legislation, it is possible 
for BRC Global Standards or similar bodies to 
assess and verify compliance of businesses so 
that the outcome of their audits can inform the 
nature, frequency and intensity of a programme 
of official controls, but currently they could 
not provide a replacement for those controls 
under the EU legislative regime. At present 
the legal position that will follow EU Exit is 
uncertain, and if there is any change in the 
current requirements post EU exit, any effect 
on the recognition of assurance schemes 
will require further consideration. This could 
include new controls relating to the export 
of goods which would be of relevance to a 
number of BRC Global Standards certificated 
establishments.”33  (Emphasis added)
The FSA-BRC report also explained that:
“Although the [BRC] Standard has been 
developed to assist businesses to meet legal 
requirements, it was the view of the CAs 
[Competent Authorities] and FSA assessors 
that this is not the primary focus of the audit 
assessment. This perceived fundamental 
difference raised a number of concerns 
about the Standard being used as the basis 
for a full replacement of CA interventions 
by BRC Global Standards audits, however 
there was general acceptance that the audits 
could be used to help inform the frequency 
and/or focus of CA interventions of certificated 
businesses.”34  (Emphasis added) 
In other words, the FSA’s aspiration to replace local 
authority and FSA inspections with those of auditing 
and monitoring programmes such as those run by 
the BRC, would not be sufficient to satisfy EFSA and/
or the European Commission to continue to allow 
UK firms to sell their food products in the EU.  In 
its 15 March 2017 paper to the FSA Board there 
was a recognition that: “…new and different trading 
relationships with other countries will demand a 
robust system of controls.”35  It is therefore unwise 
for the FSA to propose dismantling a relatively robust 
system in favour of what is likely to be a less robust 
one.
Reading across for regulatory 
compliance?
ROF 2017 innovatively suggested that evidence of 
compliance with non-food safety regulations could be 
relevant to judging food safety.  The report states: 
“We will introduce a new risk management 
framework that will determine the nature, 
frequency and intensity of the controls that a 
food business will be subject to… For example, 
we will explore the potential to take into 
account compliance performance by a business 
in other regulatory areas beyond food to judge
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the behaviour and culture within the business 
and the impact this may have on food safety 
compliance.” (Regulating our Future p. 8)
The FSA also suggests that: 
“We’ll be able to analyse the factors most 
closely correlated with poor food hygiene 
outcomes – some of these might not be 
about food itself, but might indicate poor 
management culture which is linked to 
generally low levels of compliance with any 
regulation or legal requirement. This, combined 
with available compliance information 
(including that made available to us by food 
businesses themselves and third parties), 
will help us develop a more sophisticated 
framework to define the intervention frequency 
and type for each business.” (ibid)
In response to that suggestion the Sussex Chief EHOs 
said: 
 
“The current food business inspection model 
is based on a risk assessment. It is proposed 
that this risk assessment will take into account 
information of compliance with other regulatory 
regimes...The significance [of the relationship] 
between [compliance with food safety rules 
and] compliance with different regulator 
regimes is not that simple. For example, does 
this assume that if a business completes its VAT 
returns on time, its premises must therefore be 
clean?”36 
The Sussex EHOs’ criticisms are devastating but, at 
the time of writing, the FSA had yet to respond to the 
substantive criticisms.
The FSA needs performance data, 
but so do consumers
The FSA has also acknowledged that: 
“[t]here is a fundamental weakness in the 
current model as the FSA doesn’t know in real 
time how many food businesses actually exist 
or, who is operating them. We aren’t able to 
draw a complete picture, whether in a food 
incident or crisis, or just to make the best 
decisions. We need to address this by ensuring 
that we have an overview of all food businesses 
rather than this important data just being held 
by individual local authorities as at present.”37 
The FSA’s ROF document also states that:
“[i]n the new regime, the FSA will set standards 
so that food businesses of all types understand 
what is required of them.”38   
But that is a curious comment; it suggests that the 
FSA is well aware that some or many food businesses 
do not know what is expected of them.  If FBOs do not 
understand what is required of them, then the status 
quo is seriously problematic. On the other hand, if 
they do not know what is required of them, they may 
not realise that they are expected to contract third-
party assurance providers, and even if they do, their 
chosen sub-contractor may not provide the most 
appropriate guidance. 
Those facts suggest that it would be a very good 
idea to enforce the registration of all FBOs, before 
they can operate, but it is clearly not happening.  
Registration of commercial food businesses has been 
compulsory in the UK and all other EU Member States 
since 2004, under the provisions of a European 
Regulation.39  Compliance with the Regulation 
is however incomplete.  Registration is currently 
unconditional; it cannot be refused. In the paper to 
the 15 March 2017 meeting of the FSA Board, there 
was an acknowledgement that: 
“…the current approach to registration, within 
which many businesses do not fulfil their 
obligations to register with the relevant LA 
[Local Authority] in advance of trading and 
rarely inform them of significant changes to 
their business activities, was no longer fit for
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purpose.”40  
In response, the FSA hopes to establish a system that 
they refer to as ‘enhanced registration’, which the FSA 
has characterised as: 
“[a]n enhanced system of registration for 
businesses, which will mean securing better 
information on all businesses so that we can 
better identify and manage risk across the food 
chain.”41   
Enhanced registration of all FBOs will mean that the 
Agency will: 
“…have better information on which to identify 
and manage risk across the food chain. It 
will mean we, our delivery partners in local 
authorities, and others, can respond more 
quickly and effectively to food incidents, and 
improve consumer protection. Knowing more 
about a food business will enable us to make 
better judgments about regulating it.”42 
To achieve that outcome, however, the FSA will also 
need adequate information about the FBOs’ sources 
of supplies and about their customers, though ROF 
2017 failed to acknowledge that fact, although it 
had previously been acknowledged in the report, 
providing an update on the ROF Programme, to the 
FSA’s Board meeting on 15 March 2017.43  The FSA 
also assumed that it will have full access to all the 
necessary data, and that all the data the Agency 
receives will be reliable and comprehensive. 
The paper from the FSA’s ROF team to the FSA’s Board 
meeting on 15 March 2017 referred to a ‘Permit to 
Trade’ approach, which implied that the FSA was then 
proposing to make registration not just compulsory, 
but also conditional.  Registration would only be 
granted if the applicant could show that they could 
operate safely.  It said:
“We have developed a 2nd iteration…which 
reflects our thinking on development of a 
digitally enabled and enhanced approach 
to registration of food businesses with an 
associated permissioning process requiring 
businesses to demonstrate compliance with 
elements of food safety and food standards 
before they start to trade.”44  (emphases 
added)
That aspect of the proposals was absent from the 
July 2017 ROF document.  The March 2017 document 
had acknowledged that making a Permit To Trade 
mandatory and conditional on demonstrating: “…that 
certain food safety requirements have been met…”45  
would require legislative change in Parliament, which 
ministers might not be willing to endorse. 
The FSA acknowledged that it would be better 
equipped to meet its responsibilities in relation 
to food safety if it was far better informed about 
what FBOs were operating, where and how.  ROF 
2017 however failed to provide any indication as 
to how, and from whom, it expects to be able to 
learn that particular FBOs weren’t meeting their 
responsibilities, but were failing to comply with 
statutory requirements.  
One unattractive scenario is that such learning on 
the part of the FSA would be achieved only once 
an outbreak of food poisoning had occurred, and 
only if that outbreak was on a sufficiently large scale 
that epidemiological investigators, by eg Public 
Health England (PHE), had been able to identify the 
pathogen concerned and traced it to the outbreak’s 
source.  The FSA needs to have sufficient information 
to know when and where full compliance with food 
safety requirements is not being achieved, in order 
to take the necessary actions, to avoid outbreaks of 
food poisoning.   
The FSA wants to receive lots of data from firms, 
local authority officers and third-party assurance 
providers but one problem with that scenario is that 
PHE’s investigators have to rely on local authority 
inspectors to identify the FBOs that might be 
responsible, and for collecting samples for testing. 
Therefore, if implementing ROF 2017 proposals 
results in reductions in the number of EHOs and
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TSOs, then PHE investigators and the FSA will struggle 
to gain the information that they require to discharge 
their responsibilities. 
How and when the FSA will obtain the information it 
needs will be a function of who will be entrusted by 
the FBOs and their third-party service providers, to 
gain access to vital data, and the conditions under 
which those data will be shared.  Inevitably the 
FBOs know more about what they are doing, and 
not doing, than anyone else.  Implementing the ROF 
2017 proposals will imply that the next best informed 
group should be the third-party assurance service 
providers; they should have access to a sub-set of the 
data possessed by the FBOs with which they have 
contracts.  Those third-party assurance businesses 
should, in turn, be inspected and audited by local 
authority EHOs and TSOs, who correspondingly will 
have access to a sub-set of the data possessed by 
the third-party assurance provider.  But that leaves 
unresolved the conditions under which any of those 
data might become available to the FSA, and there 
is even less clarity about the conditions under which 
any of that information might be made available to 
customers and the general public. 
Currently, local authority EHOs and TSOs do not 
routinely provide the FSA with all the information 
about problems that they uncover.  If a problem is 
confined to one locality, and if the local officials deem 
the problem to have been resolved, no information 
about those problems need reach the FSA.  Local 
authority officials only inform the FSA if they have 
evidence that problems may not be confined to 
their jurisdiction.  In the normal course of events, 
detailed information gathered by local authority and 
FSA officials about serious failures of food safety 
only enter the public domain as and when the 
offending companies, and their senior managers, are 
prosecuted and brought to court; in those conditions 
the information is disclosed in open court.  If some 
of that information had been released at an earlier 
stage, lawyers representing the company concerned 
would argue that public disclosure of evidence could 
have compromised their clients’ chances of receiving 
a fair trial.  
On the issue of public access to information, the 
ROF 2017 proposals were couched in distinctly 
problematic terms: 
 “Of course, there is a balance for us to strike 
between providing consumers with information 
that gives them confidence about the food 
they are buying, and respecting business 
concerns around sharing commercially 
sensitive data…We believe that the interests 
of the consumer will be better served by 
an effective regulatory regime in which 
food businesses feel confident to share 
data with us in confidence, rather than by 
the routine publication of all and any data we 
are able to access. Under no circumstances 
will we share any data without the express 
permission of its owner, and we will be 
working closely with food businesses, their 
lawyers and ours to establish protocols that 
are compliant with relevant legislation (e.g. 
on data protection) and will satisfy the needs 
of everyone [but not consumers] involved. 
We hope that, alongside these steps, food 
businesses can become more directly open 
with their own customers about how they 
ensure that food is safe and trustworthy.”46   
(emphases added)
The script writers of Yes Minister would be proud if 
they had drafted that wording.  The pretence is that 
the interests of consumers are best served by the 
FSA promising FBOs that no information whatsoever 
about their failures to operate safe and hygienic 
production systems would ever be shared with 
consumers or with the general public.  But that would 
hardly enable shoppers and consumers to make 
informed choices about what to buy and what to eat.  
Public access to food safety information is not just 
about ‘giving them confidence about the food they 
are buying’, it is about allowing them to tell when 
confidence is, and is not, warranted. Consumers 
deserve to, and should always, be informed if the 
food industry’s processes or products are less than 
safe. Promising FBOs to keep consumers in the dark
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is antithetical to the interests of consumers and the 
protection of public health.
ROF 2017 stated that: “We [the FSA] want to build a 
new relationship with the food industry based on 
mutual trust.”47  But that wording fails to make clear 
what the FSA is trusting the food industry to do, and 
with what information, or the conditions under which 
the food industry will be expected to trust the FSA 
with some or all of its data.  
When the FSA was established, we were told that 
the FSA’s job would be to ‘put consumers first’48, but 
that requires not trusting the food industry; rather 
it requires that FBOs are effectively and thoroughly 
regulated, inspected and audited by organisations 
with which they have neither contractual relations, 
nor relations of trust.  Remarkably enough, the report 
of the joint FSA-BRC study expressed concern that 
the FSA’s proposals had the: “…[P]otential for public 
trust in food hygiene inspection being damaged if a 
commercial company was to take the lead role.”49   
It is entirely understandable that the FSAs want to 
have access to data that companies collect on their 
own standards of hygiene and food safety, but that 
access should be achieved, not by the FSA promising 
FBOs to keep all their dirty secrets out of the public 
domain, but by asking ministers to change the law 
so as to empower the FSAs to oblige FBOs, local 
authority officers and third part providers to provide 
the FSAs with all the data they require to ensure that 
they put consumers first and protect public health.
In the 17 March 2017 paper to the Board updating it 
on the progress of the ROF project, the FSA proposed: 
“…to develop arrangements for central oversight of all 
businesses by the FSA and to make the data available 
to those organisations providing assurance in the 
model.”  (p 7 para 4.22)  That implies that the FSA is 
potentially willing to share data with private sector 
sub-contractors, but unwilling to share those data 
with UK consumers.
The manner in which the FSA responded to the 
results of its unannounced inspection of the 
operations of a Russell Hume facility on 12th January 
2018 is also revealing.  While the FSA stopped 
Russell Hume from distributing meat from its plants 
on 19th January, and initiated a recall of Russell 
Hume products on the 23rd January, it only provided 
information to the public on 24th January when it 
issued a press release.  Moreover that press release 
was almost certainly provoked by the fact that the 
FSA learnt that ITV News at 10 was about to put the 
story into the public domain.  In other words, the FSA 
was very slow about sharing the information it had 
gained, and was gaining, with the British public, and 
if News at 10 had not been on the case, we do not 
know what information, if any, the FSA would have 
disclosed. 
The FSA recognised that:
“One of the most important areas of focus 
will be how we – the FSA – audit, inspect 
and assure the authorities and organisations 
that are themselves inspecting, verifying, and 
assuring the data that our new model depends 
upon. This will require us to develop and 
implement new arrangements to verify that all 
assurance providers, both in the private and 
public sectors, are meeting the standards that 
we will set and we will take timely and firm 
action when the evidence shows that they are 
not. This is an additional important area for 
openness and transparency.”50
Quite how the FSA thinks it can openly and 
transparently verify that all assurance providers, 
in the private and public sectors, are meeting the 
required standards, while guaranteeing that the 
FBO’s dirty secrets will all be kept out of the public 
domain, is entirely unclear. 
The 1999 Food Standards Act should be amended 
to give the FSAs the power to oblige FBOs to collect 
minimum food safety and quality monitoring data
FRC Food Brexit Policy Briefing
Weakening UK food law enforcement: a risky tactic in Brexit
18
on their ingredients, processes and products, and 
the power to require all FBOs to share those data 
with their local authorities and with the FSA. Those 
data should be used, amongst other things, to create 
and publish food safety performance league tables, 
categorising all types of FBOs along the lines of the 
Food Hygiene Rating System, rather than restricting 
the scheme just to restaurants and cafes.
The ROF programme has been met with serious 
concerns in private. It is time this important food 
‘infrastructure’ was properly debated and that the 
public is informed about what is being rolled through 
in its name. This briefing concludes:
ROF is risky public policy
The Food Standards Agency has failed to show that 
its proposals in Regulating Our Future will ensure 
that the premises and operations of all FBOs will be 
adequately inspected to ensure the proper protection 
of consumers and high standards of public health.  
On the contrary, the policy that it articulated is based 
on a set of false assumptions.  If it is implemented, 
food safety standards in the UK can be expected to 
decline.  Public health will deteriorate; consumers 
will suffer.  Presumed savings from reductions in 
expenditures by the FSAs and local authorities are 
likely to be more than offset by increased costs to 
the NHS, individual households and the UK economy 
in aggregate.  Furthermore, the blame for those 
problems is likely to fall on the FSA.  The ministers 
responsible for forcing this foolish policy onto the 
FSA will have moved on, while those in ministerial 
office when the adverse consequences emerge will 
disclaim responsibility and blame the FSA.  From the 
perspective of the sceptics on the FSA’s staff, ROF 
2017 looks like a draft institutional suicide note, just 
when the UK public desperately needs a strong body 
fiercely protecting the public health and the public 
interest.
There is one aspect of the FSA’s proposals which 
does deserve some welcome by consumers, however. 
This is the proposal to insist on enforcing the 
mandatory registration of all FBOs, and to implement 
an ‘enhanced registration’ procedure.  Local authority 
Environmental Health Officers want to be lawfully 
empowered to refuse to register food businesses 
that cannot demonstrate their ability to produce food 
that is safe or what it says it is. Moreover, many EHOs 
would welcome higher penalties for food businesses 
that do not register before they start trading. 
Conflicts of interest
The FSA’s proposal effectively to privatise food 
safety inspections and audits will unavoidably 
create conflicts of interest, in particular between 
the commercial interests of the FBOs and the 
interests of consumers.  The FSA’s document neither 
acknowledges that problem, nor does it provide any 
solution to diminish consequent harm. 
A key conflict is cost. The FSA developed the 
Regulating Our Future proposals under pressure 
from the government to drive down the costs of its 
activities and those of local authority Environmental 
Health Officers, Trading Standards Officers and Public 
Analysts. The FSA evidently did not have the political 
courage that would have been required to tell the 
Government that food safety cannot be achieved on 
the cheap.  A document articulating that fact could 
have been an institutional suicide note, but it would 
have compelled ministers to take responsibility for 
their own follies, rather than hiding behind the FSA. 
Implementing the proposals in ROF 2017 will most 
probably harm public health in the UK, and damage 
the FSA’s reputation.  But it would almost certainly 
harm the ability of UK FBOs to sell their products in 
the single market of the European Union.  
Conclusions
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Only rarely have ministers clarified their overall 
strategy for the future of farming and the food 
industry in the UK, but one exception is that they 
have explicitly proclaimed a future, post-Brexit in 
which exports of UK food and agricultural products 
will boom.  Implementing the ROF 2017 policies will 
almost certainly make it far harder for UK producers 
to have access to EU markets, and the EU is far and 
away the largest export market for UK food products.  
But then, ministerial teams and the sum of their 
policies are not always consistent.
Bad timing, wrong policy
The ROF proposals predate the Brexit referendum, 
but the result transformed the context within the FSA 
will have to work, especially after the UK leaves the 
EU.  When the UK ceases to be a member of the EU, 
the workloads and responsibilities of the FSAs will 
increase substantially.  They will be expected not 
just to keep UK consumers safe but also to enable 
UK FBOs to export their products, especially to EU 
Member States.  That will almost certainly require 
specific official UK certification, which is not currently 
required.  The UK government has yet to acknowledge 
that Brexit will entail a substantial increase in the 
responsibilities and workloads of the FSAs, and 
therefore that their budgets, staffing and competence 
levels will have to increase.
As and when the UK ‘takes back control’ of its own 
food safety standards, the FSAs will need to be in 
a position to advise the government on the extent 
to which they do or do not endorse the numerous 
diverse food standards that will then prevail in all the 
international markets from which the UK will import 
its food.  Those responsibilities will be substantially 
greater than those currently borne by UK institutions.  
In effect, the UK has been out-sourcing most of its 
food standards to the European Food Safety Authority 
and to EU’s Regulations and Directives.  After Brexit 
the FSAs will be far busier, and need to be far better 
resourced, than is currently the case, or currently 
envisaged for the future.
A stronger not weaker FSA is 
needed
If the FSA, and its counterparts in the devolved 
administrations, are to ensure food safety in the UK, 
especially once the UK has left the EU, then they will 
need greater resources of money and personnel to 
enhance their capabilities, but far more than that will 
be needed. 
If the FSAs and their local authority food safety 
counterparts, are to ensure that FBOs only sell 
products that are safe, and what they say they are, 
then they will need significantly enhanced powers 
to require Food Business Operators to provide their 
data on food safety, as requested.  Those enhanced 
powers are solely in the gift of Parliament and the 
government.  If they fail to enact the legislation 
necessary to provide public officials with the power to 
obtain unrestricted access to the data the FSAs deem 
essential, from FBOs and their third-party assurance 
providers, then responsibility (and blame) for 
outbreaks of food poisoning and food safety scares 
will be theirs.  
Data ownership is a key issue
The idea that FBOs and their third-party assurance 
sub-contractors will readily share any data the FSAs 
request, in exchange for a promise to keep all those 
data, and presumably all analyses of those data, 
entirely confidential is profoundly misconceived.  
Firstly, it will fundamentally undermine public 
confidence in the FSAs and their local authority 
counterparts.  You cannot ‘put consumers first’ by 
keeping them in the dark. 
Secondly, if those data are being gathered by 
the FSAs to enable them to implement their 
responsibilities to ‘put consumers first’, one of the 
most effective ways of using those data to improve 
public safety and to raise food safety standards 
would be to analyse the data in a way that will
1  
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enable them to construct league tables of the relative 
performance of the FBOs, and/or to categorise them 
into groups such as those used for the Food Hygiene 
Rating system.  When the FSAs publish league tables 
of the safety performance of FBOs, consumers, 
retailers and caterers will know far more about 
standards in different parts of the food industry than 
they currently do.  Giving consumers that information, 
will empower them to make more well-informed 
decisions about what they buy and consume.
The FSA was created to put 
consumers first; ROF does not do 
this
Putting consumers first, which is precisely what the 
FSA was set up to do51, requires that the public are 
well-informed about which food companies’ safety 
standards are high and which are low.  If League 
Tables can raise standards in schools, they could 
have an even more rapid beneficial effect in raising 
industrial and commercial food safety standards.  
Instead of guaranteeing to keep consumers well-
informed, ROF 2017 proposed, in effect, to exempt 
information about the safety standards of FBOs from 
the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.  
If the UK government, and the FSAs, are to protect 
food-related public health, almost every aspect of 
RoF 2017 should be discarded.  Instead the FSAs 
should concentrate on setting and enforcing higher 
standards, especially for microbiological food safety.  
For example, chicken carcasses and cuts of meat 
should be clean enough that they can safely be 
washed. The instruction just to cook them thoroughly 
is tantamount to advising the public to eat well 
cooked chicken faeces.  That is not what the British 
public want or deserve.
Recommendations
If the UK government, and the FSAs, are to 
protect food-related public health, almost every 
aspect of ROF 2017 should be discarded. 
The 1999 Food Standards Act should be 
amended to give the FSA (and counterparts 
in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales) the 
power to oblige FBOs to collect minimum food 
safety and quality monitoring data on their 
ingredients, processes and products, and the 
power to require all FBOs to share those data 
with their local authorities and with the FSA.
Those data should be used, amongst other 
things, to create and publish food safety 
performance league tables, categorising all 
types of FBOs along the lines of the Food 
Hygiene Rating System, rather than restricting 
the scheme just to restaurants and cafes.
A special Parliamentary joint select committee, 
between the Health and Environment, Food & 
Rural Affairs committees, should be urgently 
convened to review the ROF proposals. 
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